Before the trial court, the parties agreed that John R. and Christopher P. set forth the applicable test of equitable estoppel.   Consistent with these authorities, plaintiff presented evidence, summarized above, to demonstrate that Diaz made ongoing threats in connection with his molestation of plaintiff.   Further, plaintiff claimed the effect of these threats was still operating on him shortly before he filed his application to file a late claim with the District on July 19, 2002.   The District did not directly refute plaintiff's evidence that Diaz's threats deterred plaintiff from bringing any legal action against Diaz. Until a combination of events occurred-including confirmation that police were investigating Diaz for pedophilia, plaintiff's enrollment in a witness protection program, and plaintiff's receipt of psychological counseling, beginning on July 8, 2002-plaintiff continued to fear Diaz would deliver on his threats to ruin plaintiff's reputation.   Instead, the District, in its briefing to the  trial court, attempted to distinguish John R. and Christopher P. principally on the basis that plaintiff was an adult when he filed his petition, arguing that “those cases involved a child in the ninth grade and an eleven-year-old as compared to a nineteen-year-old collegiate wrestler․” The District makes similar arguments on appeal.
It is unclear to what extent the trial court was persuaded by the District's arguments.   However, the fact that plaintiff was an adult when he first pursued his claim against the District appears to have been a central consideration in the court's ruling.   To reiterate, the court's order mentioned four points in time at which estoppel might cease and stated, without explanation, that the evidence did not support extending estoppel beyond any of them:  (1) plaintiff's departure from the District;  (2) plaintiff's graduation from high school;  (3) plaintiff's attainment of adulthood;  and (4) plaintiff's termination of his relationship with Diaz.
On the basis of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying relief on the grounds the evidence did not support application of equitable estoppel beyond the four events the court identified in its order.   The court cited and we know no legal authorities holding that estoppel would necessarily be cut off upon any of these events.   Nothing in John R. or Christopher P. suggests the test for estoppel depends on the victim's age.   Rather, “[t]hese cases have the following in common:  In each, the public entity or one of its agents engaged in some calculated conduct or made some representation or concealed facts which induced the plaintiff not to file a claim or bring an action within the statutory time;  and in each, the plaintiff acted promptly, almost always within a year, after the public entity's conduct which caused the estoppel ceased.”   (Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1047, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 777.)   The question of whether plaintiff acted within a reasonable time is measured from the time the deterrent effect of the unconscionable conduct of the District or its agent ceased.  (See ibid.)
Plaintiff presented undisputed evidence of circumstances giving rise to estoppel which occurred after the events listed by the trial court.   Plaintiff presented evidence that, after he departed junior high school and started high school in a different school district, Diaz continued to abuse him sexually and to threaten to humiliate him publicly if he ever disclosed the abuse by telling people plaintiff was gay and that he knew “people in high places” whom he could call upon to “take [plaintiff] down.”   The evidence showed that plaintiff believed Diaz's threats, which cunningly played off plaintiff's typical adolescent concerns relating to his popularity among his classmates.   Diaz's threats also invoked his status as an authority figure who could command others to act.   Plaintiff's fears were further reinforced by Diaz's apparent  ability to enlist others, including plaintiff's own parents, the high school “attendance lady,” and plaintiff's classmates, to unwittingly aid Diaz in communicating his threats and ensuring his continued physical access to plaintiff.
Diaz continued to engage in similar calculating conduct after plaintiff graduated from high school.   The evidence indicates that when plaintiff turned 18 and moved out on his own, Diaz actively pursued plaintiff, subjecting him to threatening telephone calls, finding out where he lived, and ingratiating himself with plaintiff's roommate in order to gain access to their apartment when plaintiff was absent.   There is no indication Diaz's threats lost any of their efficacy after plaintiff became an adult or ended his relationship with Diaz. Rather, plaintiff presented evidence that he continued to be deterred by Diaz's threats.   Plaintiff's emotionally charged disclosure of Diaz's abuse to his girlfriend in late 2001, rather than evidencing he was no longer afraid of Diaz as the District suggests, demonstrated that Diaz's threats were still acting strongly on him.   Plaintiff became hysterical when his girlfriend suggested going to the police, specifically alluded to Diaz's past threats as a reason for not reporting the abuse, and threatened to kill himself.
The record supports a conclusion that Diaz's threats were still having a deterrent effect when he disclosed the abuse for the first time in late 2001.   Moreover, plaintiff declared that it was not until after the police investigation of Diaz commenced, and plaintiff was enrolled in a witness protection program and received counseling from a psychotherapist, whom he met for the first time just 10 days before he filed his late-claim application with the District, that he felt he had reason to believe Diaz would not be able to follow through with his threats.   At the hearing, plaintiff testified he sought legal advice for the first time after he met with the psychotherapist.   These facts reflect that plaintiff acted within a reasonable time to pursue his claim against the District after the deterrent effect of the threats ceased.   It is also significant that the District does not dispute that Diaz sexually abused plaintiff throughout the majority of his teenage years.   According to the District's witness, Detective Armendariz, he was contacted in November 2001, after Diaz admitted to the school principal that he abused children.   As we discussed in Christopher P., a delay in reporting abuse under these circumstances is a common phenomenon.  (See Christopher P. v. Mojave Unified School Dist., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 173, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 353.)   When the abuse is coupled with ongoing threats like in this case, this may be sufficient evidence to support an estoppel.  (Ibid.)
Further, we are not persuaded by the District's attempts to distinguish John R. and Christopher P. For reasons discussed above, the fact that plaintiff was an adult when he first pursued his claim against the District did not preclude him  from invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel.   The District also makes much of the fact that plaintiff was not physically fearful of Diaz. There is no requirement that the abuser's threats must be physical in nature.   Like the teacher in John R., Diaz made threats to retaliate against plaintiff if he disclosed the abuse, including threats to represent to others that plaintiff was somehow responsible for instigating the relationship and that it was therefore plaintiff's fault, not Diaz's.   Similarly, the District makes repeated reference to the fact that plaintiff was a wrestler and a college athlete, suggesting this is somehow relevant to the estoppel analysis.   However, like the factor of age, strength, athletic ability, and educational status, by themselves, have no bearing on whether an abuser's threats have effectively deterred a victim from reporting the abuse or whether the deterrent effect of the threats have stopped.   Adult athletes and college students are equally capable of being sexually abused and threatened as any other type of victim.
None of the other evidence relied on by the district establishes that plaintiff suddenly became impervious to Diaz's threats when he became an adult.   The District asserts that plaintiff “continued to maintain” his relationship with Diaz into adulthood, pointing to evidence that Diaz co-signed plaintiff's car loan and plaintiff's testimony that he terminated his relationship with Diaz because he “just didn't want to do it anymore.”   The District infers from this that plaintiff was no longer afraid of Diaz and argues it was therefore unreasonable for plaintiff to wait two years after ending his relationship with Diaz to bring his request to file a late claim against the District.   However, when analyzed in light of all the circumstances presented by the evidence, the District's inference is unreasonable.   The evidence indicates that, far from becoming a consensual relationship when plaintiff reached adulthood, Diaz merely continued his pattern of manipulating plaintiff and inserting himself into plaintiff's life as he had when plaintiff was a minor.   Although plaintiff ultimately ended the relationship, there was evidence the deterrent effect of Diaz's threats continued, more than a year later, when he first disclosed the abuse to his girlfriend.   Plaintiff said that due to Diaz's threats and his fear of Diaz, he had planned to take the circumstances of the abuse with him “to his grave.”
In sum, plaintiff demonstrated that he was entitled to relief from the claims-presentation requirements of the Tort Claims Act by presenting undisputed evidence supporting application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel beyond the four events identified by the trial court in its order denying relief.   Because the correct test for estoppel and sufficient evidence to support each of the test's three prongs were presented for the court's consideration, there is no need to remand for further factual determinations as in  John R. and Christopher P. In the appropriate case, remand may be necessary.   But based on the evidence in the record here it was an abuse of discretion for the court to reach the conclusion it did.3
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