4. Equitable estoppel.
 a. General principles.
 “It is well settled that a public entity may be estopped from asserting the limitations of the claims statute where its agents or employees have prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative act.”  (John R., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 445, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948;  accord Christopher P., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 170, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 353;  V.C., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 516, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 103.)   Estoppel as a bar to a public entity's assertion of the defense of noncompliance arises when the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence:  (1) the public entity was apprised of the facts, (2) it intended its conduct to be acted upon, (3) plaintiff was ignorant of the true state of facts, and (4) relied upon the conduct to his detriment.  (Christopher P., supra, at p. 170, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 353.)
 Estoppel “most commonly results from misleading statements about the need for or advisability of a claim․” (John R., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 445, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948.)   Estoppel may also “be established by acts of intimidation or violence that are intended to prevent the filing of a claim.  (John R., supra, at p. 445[, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948].)   In John R., for example, the court found that the doctrine of equitable estoppel could be applied when a student failed to tell his parents about a teacher's sexual abuse because the teacher threatened to retaliate if he disclosed the incidents.  (Id. at pp. 445-446[, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948];  see also Doe v. Bakersfield City School Dist., supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at pp. 571-573[, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 79] [undisputed evidence of teacher's threats and the plaintiff's fear, even into adulthood, supported application of the equitable estoppel doctrine];  Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist., supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 1050[, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 777] [teacher's continuous verbal threats and intimidating conduct, including driving by student's new school and filing a defamation action against her for reporting abuse to school officials, supported application of the equitable estoppel doctrine];   Christopher P., supra, at p. 173[, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 353] [‘A directive by an authority figure to a child not to tell anyone of the molestation is a sufficient inducement of delay to invoke an estoppel’].)”   (V.C., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 516-517, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 103.)
 b. K.J. failed to allege facts supporting the application of equitable estoppel against the District.
 K.J. has not alleged any acts of violence or intimidation by Sutliff that were intended to deter her from presenting a tort claim to the District.  (John R., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 445, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948.)   Nor has K.J. alleged Sutliff made any misleading statements about the need for, or advisability of, a claim.  (Ibid.) In the absence of such allegations, K.J. has failed to plead a basis to estop the District from asserting her noncompliance with the claims statutes.
Here, K.J.'s theory is she felt dependency, loyalty, affection and friendship toward Sutliff, such that she did not even know she had been molested and victimized.   K.J.'s theory implicates the doctrine of delayed discovery, rather than equitable estoppel.
