Re: [Discussion] Wade Robson files claim of sexual abuse against MJ-Estate
OK, so my summary and notes:
Robson will give a declaration on a motion for summary judgement. He already has submitted a declaration on a motion for summary judgement. It's about his claims about what he claims MJ did to him, about MJ allegedly threatening him and that it had some sort of effect on him.
Estate says they know the Judge is required to accept everything Robson claims as true. They make it clear they do not think it's true, but they know the Judge has to consider his claims at this stage as true. They argue that even if his claims are accepted as true the case still cannot go ahead as a matter of law.
First subject: discovery
Estate says the law is clear on that when you request discovery you have to be specific about what the discovery is about. Judge: "I agree."
Robson's claim is he was imprisoned in his mind therefore unable to make claims earlier.
Robson's lawyer: they feel to establish equitable estoppel they need to bring the court's attention to "more than just what happened to Wade".
"This was an orchestrated plan by Mr. Jackson not just with respect to Mr. Robson but numerous other children. This was his modus operandi if you will. So we think that is relevant in connection with equitable estoppel. Not just with respect to Wade individually, but with respect to what were the other facts and circumstances surrounding his particular sexual abuse, and we think that is relevant."
IMO they know their own case is weak and they try to strengthen it by dragging the previous allegations into it - Jordan, Gavin. Trying to create this mess once again, hoping that will somehow push Wade through.
Judge asks: "Have you seen any issue, have you seen any case like this in any jurisdiction in the United States where estoppel is used in a probate case on a creditor's claim issue?"
Marzano: Not quite in our situation.
Judge is basically saying what we have been saying here that he doesn't know how dragging the previous allegations into it would help them get around statutes of limitations:
"I am not sure that having child A, B or C, in addition to those claims is more helpful to you because I am not weighing credibility under the statutes. Right? I am determining whether there is a disputed material fact. And that is why I don't think that the issue about discovery is necessarily as I sit here today determinative on the issue."
The whole discovery thing looks like a fishing expedition with Robson's side not even knowing what they are looking for:
Marzano: "So part of the problem is not only do we not know what is it that we are going to get, will we need to compel something further, but thirdly, which is very important and falls squarely within the statute, is the fact that we have not had the opportunity then to get this discovery first and take the necessary depositions of for example the two executors and potentially others.
So we are setting to the side saying: "Yes, we of course know what evidence we will be presenting through Mr. Robson and his doctor." What we don't know is what else is out there that we think could well be relevant to our position."
Judge: "I just don't think we know exactly what you're going to get and how that might impact your defense, so I want to leave my options open. Your options are certainly open. But I will deny the request today on these facts."
I do not quite understand what request he denied. I assume it's some opposition by the estate against Robson's discovery request that was denied because the discovery was allowed.
So basically what happened: the Judge agreed with the Estate lawyer that to grant discovery the requesting party needs to be specific as to what they are looking for. Marzano (Robson's lawyer) actually states herself that they do not know what is there for them in the discovery. So doesn't that mean they could not be specific about what they are looking for? The Judge also says he does not think bringing in former allegations has anything to do with whether they are within statutes.
And despite of all that he allows discovery. :smilerolleyes:
Second subject: demurrers
Judge says Estate did not have a standing to file the Doe 1 demurrer (about MJ being sued as a natural person), because they are not a party. But the Judge thought about striking Doe 1 defendant on his own motion, but he still doesn't, apparently accepting Robson's tactical reasons for leaving MJ in the lawsuit...
He overrules the demurrer on the basis that the moving parties do not have standing.
Other demurrer (companies):
Judge asks Estate if their position is that "a solely owned corporation by an alleged perpetrator of sexual abuse could never be liable or would never be able to survive a statute of limitations problem of the case was filed when the victim - alleged vicim - is over 26?"
Steinsapir (Estate lawyer): "Ultimately under the facts alleged, these corporations, these solely owned corporations, could not control the perpetrator here. Do I think there is never a situation? I don't know because I have not seen every solely owned corporation."
Steinstapir says there are two steps: first you have to allege a cause of action, something about negligent hiring, negligent supervision etc. and Robson failed to do so.
Steinstapir: "Okay, so you ask whether authority could ever be possible? I don't think it is possible here, but I haven't seen what the allegations are. Is it that they negligently supervise Michael Jackson? That they should not have kept him employed? That they should not have let him be in music videos with Mr. Robson? I don't know what exactly the allegations are as to what their duty of care was and how they were negligent."
Then after alleging a cause of action they also need to allege facts that come withing subdivisioun (B)2 (ie. the companies knowingly turned a blind eye etc.)
Steinstapir: "Obviously we ask, as we always will, that the demurrer be sustained without legal amend. But I think at this point we need to see what the cause of action is against the corportate defendants. Because the only cause action here is that they abused Robson which is not viable as a matter of law under the case."
Marzano argues that they have "some limited evidence" that the companies were not solely controlled by MJ, but they need the discovery evidence to establish that:
"What we have independently been able to determine is that there were in fact other people who, whether they owned or had an ownership in these entities - the two named entities - don't know that fact - but we do know that they held positions of authority and power. Unless we are hearing that the corporations were in fact sham corportations, which I don't think is the case.
And some of those people included the executor himself, John Branca, who had been the secretary of Michael Jackson Productions at least as of December 31, 1982. Don't know if he still - how long he stayed in that position.
There was another gentleman - and this is through research through the department of corporations secretary of state - Richard Sherman, who was the secretary of Michael Jackson Productions as of April 3, 1991."
"And most importantly we have Norma Staikos who we alleged in our complaint had a very active role both in the corporate management and in the facilitation of getting Wade Robson and his family to th United States and into the various roles of participating in dance videos, being available at the Neverland Ranch, being available at the Hideout, etc. etc. We have independently found information and a letter that Ms. Staikos signed where she appears as the executive director of Michael Jackson Productions.
So to me these are not situations where the two entity defendants are solely Michael Jackson and no one else with any control or ability to monitor or rein wrongful conduct."
Regarding that they have to claim a cause of action first Marzano says: "And we would certainly be willing and at least partially able with the situation where we are in with no discovery responses to amend, to perhaps include allegations and causes of action arising therefrom with regard to negligence claims."
It's a bit messy to me but it appears that Marzano tries to argue that if they allege a cause of action, it's enough to establish that the company had a duty of care to the plaintiff and that "an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse".
She then cites 340.1 (B)2 - this part:
if the person or entity knew
or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful
sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent,
and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable
safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by
that person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding
placement of that person in a function or environment in which
contact with children is an inherent part of that function or
environment.
And she says: "Which is precisely where we fall."
:doh:
And this is after which the Judge notes how superb the lawyering is in this case... Ugh.
They are totally twisting the law in my opinion and when you read the precedent cases they clearly support the Estate's arguments. I wouldn't say the Judge sounds biased for Robson, but I'd say he sounds clueless about child abuse matters and these particular laws and the precedent cases. It's like he is so easily lead on by Robson's side. Incredible.
Then the Judge asks when talking about 340.1 (B)2: "Is it Jordan Chandler?" Estate lawyer: "Correct."
I guess they mean that Robson's argument is that because of the Chandler case MJ's companies had reasons to know about supposed abuse. And the Judge basically accepts that as correct a correct argument that basically makes them meet all the requirements of 340.1 B(2) in case they state a cause of action! Here:
"There are some allegations about another child and about notice, and about Michael Jackson being an agent, and about reasonable steps and all of that.
So I think with a broad liberal reading of the complaint I understand the argument that we have met these 3 elements of B(2) in 340.1"
This is totally crazy! He thinks the only element missing is the establishment of a cause of action.
I'm glad to hear that then Steinsaper responsds and makes it clear that they do not meet the requirements of that law even if they allege a cause of action: "I understand giving leave to amend. I want to make one thing clear. We don't think that they can meet the requirements of subdivision (B)2 even if they allege a cause of action. I think it makes sense to let them amend and try to do that, but, you know, we will wait and see. But I want to be clear because you said you understand the liberal pleading requirements, and I don't think they have met it even under those requirements, but I understand."
Then they talk about what deadline should be given to them to amend their complaint. Marzano goes on about discovery and how evidence they would find there would help to place them "strongly within 340.1 subesection (B)2." And how because there is a lot of material to go through in discovery they would need some time to make the amendment etc.
To which the Judge says he doesn't think discovery should prevent them from alleging what they need to allege. But eventually he says there is a hearing for summary judgement on November 6 and then he wants to see where Robson stands in the process of the creation of his amended complaint and then he will see then what deadline he gives.
Then there is some discussion about the protective order to the NL search material.
