Copy of judge's tentative ruling
Case Number: BC508258 Hearing Date: April 19, 2017 Dept: 34
SUBJECT: Motion to intervene
Moving Party: Third-party Katherine Jackson (“Mrs. Jackson”
Resp. Party: Defendants John Branca and John McClain, executors of the Estate of Michael J. Jackson (“defendants”
The motion by Mrs. Katherine Jackson to intervene is DENIED.
Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED. (See Evid. Code, § 452(d).)
BACKGROUND:
Plaintiffs Broderick Morris and Qadree El-Amin commenced this action on 5/7/13 against defendants John Branca and John McClain, executors of the estate of Michael J. Jackson, for breach of contract and accounting. On 1/8/14, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint for declaratory relief, breach of contract, and accounting. The action pertains to business dealings between the plaintiffs and the late Michael Jackson (“Jackson”
, specifically, the formation of a new company, The Michael Jackson Company (“TMJC”
. There is a dispute as to the parties’ ownership interests in TMJC.
On 4/14/14, the Court granted defendants’ motion for abatement. The instant action was abated until there was a final adjudication in the Probate Court of an 850 petition in BP117321. On March 27, 2017, the Probate Court issued its ruling on the section 850 petition, finding that the “Estate of Michael Jackson is the sole member of the Michael Jackson Company, LLC.” (Opposition, Exh. A, p. 2.)
This action remains abated; there is a Status Conference re the Probate Matter scheduled for May 25, 2017 in this department.
ANALYSIS:
“Upon timely application, any person, who has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, may intervene in the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 387(a).) “
f the person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property to transaction which is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest, unless that person’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties, the court shall, upon timely application, permit that person to intervene.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 387(b).) “But a proposed intervenor's interest is insufficient ‘when the action in which intervention is sought does not directly affect it although the results of the action may indirectly benefit or harm its owner.’ ” (Weil & Brown, Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2015) ¶ 2:418.1 [quoting Lindelli v. Town of San Anselmo (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1505].) Code of Civil Procedure section 387 is to be constructed liberally in favor of intervention. (Weil & Brown, ¶ 4:419.)
“Leave to intervene may be granted at any time — even after judgment has been rendered — if the court finds the application was ‘timely’ under the circumstances, and intervention is otherwise appropriate.” (Weil & Brown, ¶ 2:440 [citing Mallick v. Sup.Ct. (County of Marin) (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 437].) An application for intervention must be “timely” made. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 387(a).) “[W]hat is and is not ‘timely’ ultimately rests in the court’s discretion. Unreasonable delay after learning of the action or the ground for intervention may therefore result in denial of leave to intervene: ‘Aside from the statutory limitation ... it is the general rule that a right to intervene should be asserted within a reasonable time and that the intervenor must not be guilty of an unreasonable delay after knowledge of the suit.’ ” (Weil & Brown, ¶ 2:439 [citing Allen v. California Water & Tel. Co. (1947) 31 Cal.2d 104, 108]. See also Noya v. A.W. Coulter Trucking (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 838, 842-843 [court exercised discretion to deny leave to intervene where the proposed intervener took no steps to intervene until after several years and after the parties had reached a settlement agreement, because allowing intervention could delay or impede the resolution of the action].)
“A trial court has discretion to deny intervention even when a ‘direct interest’ is shown, if the interests of the original litigants outweigh the intervenor's concerns. For example, intervention will not be allowed when it would retard the principal suit, or require a reopening of the case for further evidence, or delay the trial of the action, or change the position of the original parties.” (Weil & Brown, ¶ 2:420.) Where intervention is permissive and not as of right, it is improper if it would enlarge the issues of the case. (Id., ¶ 4:436.)
The request to intervene is based on Mrs. Jackson’s asserted ownership interest in TMJC. (See Jackson Decl., ¶¶ 1-3.) Though this is likely sufficient to show a direct interest in the ownership issue, the ownership issue is no longer before the Court in this action. In ruling on the motion for abatement in April 2014, the Court noted that the section 850 petition and the instant action both sought determination of the issue of the ownership interests in TMJC. (See Minute Order 4/14/14, pp. 4-5.) As Mrs. Jackson herself states, “In the 850 Petition, Defendants Branca and McClain claimed that the Estate owned 100 percent of TMJC and thus the Estate was entitled to a judicial declaration that the Estate is TMJC's sole owner.” (Motion, p. 3:12-13.)
The Court granted the motion for abatement, and ruled that the instant action was abated until there is a final adjudication of the section 850 petition. (Id., p. 7.) Therefore, the instant action has been stayed and the issue of the ownership interests in TMJC was to be determined in the section 850 petition. To the extent that Mrs. Jackson is seeking to intervene on the ownership issue, her motion for intervention should have been made in the section 850 action. Whether or not she can make such a motion in the section 850 action – and whether to not any such motion should be granted – are issues to be decided by the Probate Court, not by this department.
The motion by Mrs. Katherine Jackson to intervene in this action is DENIED.